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STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

THE ARMY RESERVE: RELEVANT IN FORCE XXI

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL GLENN C. BREITLING United States Army Reserve

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

THE ARMY RESERVE: RELEVANT IN FORCE XXI

by

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ABSTRACT

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The Army is changing to remain an essential element of the United States national power in the information age. The first step of the Army's doctrinal journey into the future was Force This concept provides the Army's vision of future operations for the strategic Army of the early 21st Century. essential features of Force XXI are utilization of informationage technologies; integration of service components into effective battle teams; more lethal, survivable, and agile systems; and more capable soldiers and leaders. Will the modernization efforts of these features coupled with declining defense budgets, an ambiguous threat perception and a strength reduction create a readiness challenge that obviates the Army Reserve as a credible part of the total force? The answer to this question is pursued by examining doctrine, training, leader development, organizations, materiel and soldiers in the transition through Force XXI.

The Army of the future will be equipped with the most modern weapons and equipment the US can provide, relevant to the needs of the nation and adapting to meet the demands of today and the 21st Century. The Army Reserve will transition through Force XXI as the Army's combat service support connectivity from the tactical to the strategic. The degree of modernization will be directly proportional to the funds available based on the priorities established. In order to remain a relevant part of the Total Army, modernization programs must balance the tiered resourcing within the strategic force packages. The Army Reserve must be proactive in the transition to ensure that the new technology interfaces with existing systems.

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Introduction

The Army is changing to remain an essential element of the United States national power in the information age. The first step of the Army's doctrinal journey into the future was Force XXI Operations published in TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5 on 1 August 1994. Force XXI is the concept that provides the Army's vision of future operations, the evolution of full-dimensional operations for the strategic Army of the early 21st Century. It is a dynamic concept and continually evolving based on lessons learned from recent operational experience as well as the exploration of new and innovative approaches to warfighting doctrine and experimentation. The future Army, Force XXI, must be prepared to face the full spectrum of operational environments."

The Army Reserve is a component in the United States'

Security Strategy today but will it be relevant as part of the future Army, Force XXI? This developing concept and redesign of the Army at all echelons from foxhole to the industrial base appears to present a significant challenge to the Army Reserve. The essential features of Force XXI are utilization of information-age technologies; integration of service components into effective battle teams; more lethal, survivable, and agile systems; and more capable soldiers and leaders. Will the modernization efforts of these features coupled with declining defense budgets, an ambiguous threat perception and a strength

reduction create a readiness challenge that obviates the Army Reserve as a credible part of the total force?

The search for relevancy begins with the examination of the missions of the Army Reserve looking for legitimacy in the National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy, Joint Vision 2010 and Army Vision 2010. Once this foundation is set, a review of Force XXI concepts will be analyzed to determine the impact on the Army Reserve. This analysis will be accomplished through the use of the six Army imperatives or domains as the Army transitions through the Force XXI process.

Army Reserve Missions

The missions of the Army Reserve are promulgated in Army Regulation 140-1, Army Reserve: Mission, Organization and Training. From this base document the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve established the following five missions:

- 1. Provide trained and ready units to rapidly mobilize and deploy in seamless power projection force packages
- 2. Provide trained and ready individual soldiers to augment and reinforce the Army
- 3. Provide personnel service support for army retirees and veterans from active Army, Army Reserve and National Guard
 - 4. Provide land force power projection enablers
 - 5. Provide a capability to reconstitute the Army8

These missions were augmented with a memorandum from the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army stating the "core competence" capabilities of the Army Reserve will focus in the nondivisional combat service support functions and continue to maintain combat support elements. The memorandum further clarified that this did not provide exclusive domain of any mission to a component. To solve this problem, the Chief of the Army Reserve established missions that provided a basis for existence of the Army Reserve. If these missions are a means for use of the military element of United States national power then some foundation or historical documentation should be evident in the National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy.

National Security Strategy and the Army Reserve

The National Security Strategy document is the administration's report that formulates a national security strategy based on America's strengths and tailored to the current era. This strategy advances the United States interests through engagement and enlargement centered on three goals. The first goal is to enhance United States security with military forces that are ready to fight. The

This goal prominently identifies the importance of military force as a primary element of this nation's power and stipulates that this force must be sufficient to deter diverse threats and if necessary to fight and win. Within this context it

elaborates the most important component of this force as the women and men in uniform whose skill, service and dedication are the core of the United States defenses.¹³

To enhance United States security in the present international era of diverse threats, the National Security Strategy directs first and foremost developing and maintaining a strong defensive capability of forces ready and able to fight.14 It expounds on the strong defense by directing the military to be able to deter and defeat aggression in major regional contingencies. 15 In addition to a strong defensive capability, the National Security Strategy directs the establishment of a balanced force. This balanced force should be capable of providing a wide range of complementary capabilities designed to cope with unpredictable and unexpected events throughout the world. This force also must remain ready and modern to meet both the future as well as the present threats and challenges. 16 "Integral to the efforts of a balanced, strong defense is the development of new systems and capabilities, incorporating stateof-the-art technology and new and more effective combat organizations."17

The National Security Strategy identifies the primary mission of the military force as deterrence, and if deterrence fails then to fight and win the conflicts that threaten United States' vital interests. The strategy also reflects the importance of multilateral peace operations as a policy option

that promotes United States national interests. It expands on peace operations stating United States combat units are less likely to be used for most peace operations in the future, however, they may be desirable and justified based on United States national interests and as guided by the Presidential Decision Directive "United States Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations". 19

The Army Reserve is part of the Total Force Policy implemented in 1970's by then Army Chief of Staff, Creighton Abrams. ²⁰ It is as part of this total force that substantiates the existence of the Army Reserve and its contributions to the tasks delegated to the military forces by the National Security Strategy. The Army Reserve provides approximately 19.4 percent²¹ of the projected Total Army of dedicated men and women tasked to provide for the nation's strong defense, a credible deterrent, and the complement the Total Army with combat and logistics functions.

The National Security Strategy provides strategic vision to Congress, the military and both foreign and domestic constituencies as directed by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.²² The Joint Chiefs of Staff analysis of the National Security Strategy delineates the critical roles for the Armed Forces in achieving that vision. This analysis results in the National Military Strategy.

National Military Strategy and the Army Reserve

A 1996 National Military Strategy has not been published. However, it is reasonable to assume that most of the objectives, concepts, tasks and capabilities documented in the 1995 National Military Strategy will still be applicable in this era of multipolar, ambiguous security challenges with the United States military continuing to downsize. The 1995 National Military Strategy was developed around a strategy of flexible and selective engagements applied over a broad range of activities and capabilities to help shape the evolving international environment.²³

The National Military Strategy has two objectives; promote stability and thwart aggression, they are supported by three tasks: peacetime engagement; deterrence and conflict prevention; and fighting and winning our Nation's wars. To accomplish these tasks two complementary strategic concepts, overseas presence and power projection were developed.²⁴

The National Military Strategy established eight principles for the employment of United States forces engaged in fighting and winning its wars. The seventh principle is "generate the required forces by withdrawing from lower priority missions and mobilizing critical reserve forces". The Army Reserve as part of the Reserve Components and the Total Army would mobilize the forces required to support the warfighting commander in chief as part of the power projection concept.

In the military strategy's detailed explanation of how wartime power projection supports the above listed fight and win task, the need for early access to combat support and combat service support capabilities in the Reserve Components is stated as vital in meeting power projection requirements for any major regional contingency. The expeditious response by the Reserve Components was validated by the recent operations in Haiti and Kuwait for which the strategy says there was "prompt access to the Reserves, clearly indicating improved wartime capabilities". 26

The reliance on Reserve Components is succinctly stated in the strategy's force generation process quoted below.

Substantial Reserve forces will be committed to combat and combat support missions early in any major regional contingency. To backfill active forces elsewhere and to prepare for unforeseen contingencies, some reserve component forces can expect to be mobilized immediately and to remain on active duty throughout the conflict, even though they are not directly involved in operations.²⁷

The National Military Strategy describes peacetime engagement as encompassing a wide range of non-combat activities that show United States commitment, promote democratic ideals and enhance regional stability. This strategy tasks the Reserve Components to take on increased responsibility for participating in and supporting peacekeeping missions. These peacekeeping missions fall within the core competency of the Army Reserve in the areas of combat support and combat service support as directed by the Army Chief of Staff.

The National Military Strategy identifies the need for a balance of the force capabilities. Balance is referenced to combat, combat support and combat service support functions and between the active duty and the Reserve Components. This strategy was crafted for a ready American military force capable of responding quickly and decisively to protect the United States security. The justification for the Army Reserve can be summarized by General Reimer's comments. The United States Army cannot really go to war without the Reserve Component. We are truly America's Army. We have to be a seamless blend."

The National Military Strategy is a near-term daily guide for the military. It assesses the primary dangers, identifies the military objectives, determines ways to accomplish the objectives and examines the capabilities and forces required. 32 In addition to this near-term strategy an examination of the future visions is necessary to ascertain specific requirements for the Army Reserve. The two future vision documents that will be examined are Joint Vision 2010 and Army Vision 2010.

Joint Vision 2010

Joint Vision 2010 details how the United States military as a joint team will fight in the early 21st Century. It provides a conceptual template for all United States Armed Forces to use in developing their unique capabilities within the joint doctrine. 33 The vision is postulated on the total force posture to provide

the full range of military capabilities.³⁴ It also provides missions to all military organizations as well as directs the Reserve Components to become more responsive to contingencies and to reduce the time between mobilization, deployment and employment. Additionally the Reserve Component combat service support together with the active component are tasked to completely integrate into joint operations to provide logistic support and sustainment for as long as is necessary.³⁵ Joint Vision 2010 identifies combat service support as specific missions for Reserve Components. This supports and reinforces the Office of the Army Chief of Staff's memorandum designating the Army Reserve with combat service support core competency.

Based on Joint Vision 2010's operational concepts, the Army focused on its fundamental contributions to joint operations and developed Army Vision 2010.³⁶ Now it is incumbent to analyze Army Vision 2010 for guidance and missions for the Army Reserve.

Army Vision 2010

The Army's 2010 vision focuses on the Army's contribution to joint operations which is stated as prompt and sustained operations on land throughout the entire spectrum of crisis. The essence of the vision is focused on a total quality force. The total quality force is identified as active and Reserve Component men and women of intelligence and dedication. The Reserves are ascribed as equal partners to meet the challenges of

the 21st Century; who must be trained, equipped with modern, compatible equipment, and able to perform their assigned missions with their active duty counterparts and coalition partners. 39

Army Vision 2010 is the conceptual framework between Force XXI and the Army After Next. 40 Force XXI is the process of changing and modernizing the Army into the most capable force entering the 21st Century. 41 Army Vision 2010 is the concepts and technologies that enhance the capabilities for the Army around 2010. The Army After Next is the emerging long term vision looking at the geostrategic environment thirty years into the future. 42

The two security strategies, National Security and National Military Strategy, provide a historical background documenting the basic requirements, needs and missions for the Army Reserve. The two visions, Joint Vision 2010 and Army Vision 2010, looked to the future and document similar requirements, needs and missions for the Army Reserve. The recurring theme for the Army Reserve as stated in both strategies and the two visions is affirmed by the Army's current annual summary of roles and missions, United States Army Posture Statement FY97. This posture statement identifies the need now and into the future for an integrated force from the active and Reserve Components because of the operational pace caused by the volatile, uncertain and complex world today. The change to the future Army begins with Force XXI⁴⁴. To assist in understanding the potential

impacts to the Army Reserve a closer look at Force XXI is prudent.

Force XXI Concept

United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) outlines the Force XXI Concept in Land Combat in the 21st

Century. The Force XXI concept takes ideas and projects them into an extended planning period. It may incorporate technology, organizations, equipment, tactics, techniques and procedures that have not been tested or validated. Once these new ideas and technologies have been tested and proven, then new doctrine can be written to implement the validated hypothesis. Force XXI is an operational concept that was developed from experience, experimentation and conceptual thought on how to fight and conduct military operations in the 21st Century. This concept provides the framework for development of tactics, techniques and procedures that support the development of doctrine for each battlefield operating system.

The Department of the Army created a Force XXI Campaign Plan to design the 21st Century force, Force XXI. 46 The intent of the plan is to redefine the Army from top to bottom along three axes. The first axis redesigns the operating forces from foxhole to echelon above corps beginning with the division. The second axis redesigns the institutional army. The institutional Army is the sustaining base organizations authorized by Table of Distribution

and Allowances and the Title 10 functions of the Army Chief of Staff. The third axes is the acquisition of information age technologies. The process began in 1992⁴⁷ with Chief of Staff of the Army guidance to reach decisions for fielding and support by the year 2000 in order to fully field a total Army force.⁴⁸

The implications of moving from concept to reality to describe how the Force XXI Army will operate on future battlefields are tremendous, especially given the unpredictable, rapidly changing world environment. The most variable framework in which to address the implications of this future concept is in terms of their impact on Training and Doctrine Commands domains: doctrine, training, leader development, organization, materiel, and soldiers (DTLOMS)⁴⁹

The Army Imperatives / Domains

The following descriptions of the imperatives establishes the baseline for further discussion in the transition to Force XXI.

<u>Doctrine</u>. A body of thought in sufficient detail that incorporates the fundamental principles used by military forces to guide their actions in support of objectives. It provides answers and represents the consensus of how the Army conducts its operations today. It is an evolving process updated as concepts are validated through analysis, experiments, exercises or in actual operations.⁵⁰ It is authoritative but requires judgment in application. Doctrine includes tactics, techniques and procedures.⁵¹

<u>Training</u>. The instruction of personnel to individually and collectively increase their capacity to perform specific military functions and tasks.⁵² Training is an intellectual and physical process. Both mind and body must be trained for soldiers to be effective under the stress of military operations.⁵³

<u>Leader Development</u>. A purposeful, systematic process which produces effective leaders at every grade who act to develop and maintain a capable Army ready for war.⁵⁴

Organizations. The structure and composition of Army units to execute approved concepts in support of specified missions. It also considers the impact on the overall Army force program requirements. 55

<u>Materiel</u>. All items necessary to equip, operate, maintain and support military activities without distinction as to its application for administrative or combat purposes.⁵⁶

Soldiers. All the individual people of all ranks and grades, each with a specific military occupational specialty throughout the entire Army, in every activity and unit, combat, combat support or combat service support.

The process the Army will use to determine and document requirements for operational forces of the future is Requirements Determination. It is an experiential process that evolved from Concept Based Requirements System in TRADOC Regulation 11-15. The pace of change has increased so dramatically that the new reference, Requirements Determination, is published in one of

Training and Doctrine Command's little black books dated March 1996. This reference pamphlet explains for all; senior leaders in government, armed forces, industry and academia what constitutes warfighting requirements.

Our Army of the 21st century and beyond must have certain warfighting capabilities—user needs—as described in operational needs statements or presented in TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5 and amplified in operations and functional concepts. Achieving the desired future capabilities involves modifying our current doctrine, training, leader development, organization, materiel and soldier (DTLOMS) structure. These modifications are what we call "requirements". 57

Force XXI will identify requirements in all six Army domains.

Imperatives, Force XXI and the Army Reserve

Doctrine. The doctrine for Force XXI is in the development stage. The insights relative to future operational capability, tactics, techniques and procedures, science and technology research, warfighting experimentation and current operational issues are just unfolding. These insights should provide alternative means to achieve the future operational capabilities with the goal of the analysis to resolve an effective, timely, cost efficient means to achieve an operational capability. The first Advanced Warfighting Experiment of the Force XXI concept is a mechanized brigade, Task Force XXI, in a live experiment conducted at the National Training Center in the second quarter of fiscal year 1997. This is followed by a division level Advanced Warfighting Experiment in fiscal year 1998. Since most

Army Reserve units are combat service support at echelons above division the first pertinent insights will be developed after Task Force XXI. Although some insights may come from the brigade requirements that transcend the division into the strategic arena.

Changes regarding doctrine are designed to anticipate the future with its potential threats and infuse new technology into the tactics, techniques and procedures. It may be important for the changes to be resourced and implementation synchronized throughout all the domains because a change in doctrine may effect training, leader development, organizations, materiel and soldiers. When this new doctrine is implemented, it may be prudent to allow for a transition phase to accommodate a range of units; those 100 percent resourced with new technology to those still equipped with older equipment and technology and the many units in between that will have a composite mixture of some new technology with existing equipment. Research of the literature reveals that it is too early to identify what and how doctrine changes will effect the Army Reserve.

<u>Training</u>. The focus of Force XXI training programs and initiatives is automation of training development and management; development of live, virtual and constructive simulations; and internetted digital linking of training systems. ⁵⁹ These initiatives will be integrated into individual, collective and self-development training. The Army's overarching training

strategy is published in <u>Combined Arms Training Strategy</u>, ⁶⁰ this strategy describes the process that will meld these new initiatives like the Systems Approach to Training, Distributed Interactive Simulations and Distance Learning.

The Combined Arms Training Strategy is composed of two categories, current and future strategy, and describes the process used to train the total force to standard in units, institutions and through self-development. This strategy identifies, quantifies and justifies the training resources required to conduct collective training, individual training and self-development training. It is the foundation for the total Army in identifying, developing, acquiring and managing training resources and for integration and management of Army training wherever it occurs.

The current category of this training strategy is the baseline from which the future training strategy extrapolates threat, technology, force structure and capabilities and budget. This is the driving force for procurement, development and management of training resources for individuals and units 5 to 15 years in the future. Combined Arms Training Strategy interfaces with combat developments, budget processes, training development, training aids, devices, simulators and simulations to ensure integration of all proponents and joint processes. There are no published changes to this strategy detailing specific guidance for Force XXI.

The vision for training development supporting Force XXI is built on the Systems Approach to Training articulated in TRADOC
Regulation 350-70. This is a structured, logical approach to making collective, individual and self-development training decisions for the total Army. The process determines if training is needed, the type of training or exercise, who gets trained, how training is conducted, where it is presented and all training support required. This regulation does not provide policy, procedures or designate responsibilities for Force XXI training development. It did acknowledge that training development must be more responsive and able to change faster and draw on all forms of tactical engagement simulation and less on retrospective evaluation and feedback tools. 61

Distributed Interactive Simulation when fielded links all types of unit training into the same network. It eliminates geographical constraints and integrates both simulation systems and live training. This will be the base program for joint and combined training and exercise simulations. Automating the training management and development processes will assist the integration of battlefield operating systems based on mission essential tasks, training support packages and mission training plans. Distributed Interactive Simulation is the network for unit training and Distance Learning is the network for institutional training.

Distance learning is the concept of using distribution networks to provide institutional training to soldiers at home or wherever they are stationed. In this concept residence courses will only teach the periods requiring personal interaction.

Distance learning will be available on demand and task-based allowing students to progress at their own rate. This technology will place increased emphasis on self development for occupational skill proficiency and leadership development. The training material should be up to date and eliminate the outdated correspondence courses that had difficulty keeping abreast of the continual updates.

United States Army Training and Doctrine Command envisions two future institutional changes, the Total Army School System and the Total Army Training System. These systems combine the active, guard and reserve schools and military occupational skill and area of concentration courses into total army systems. The schools will be geographically and demographically located in seven regions for all three components. Each region will have instruction in leadership, professional development, health services, combat arms, combat support, and combat service support.

In 1994 the Army Reserve implemented tiered resourcing, a system that prioritizes all resources and training efforts. 64

This system prioritizes and allocates resources to units based on mobilization priority established to support the National

Military Strategy. The units first to deploy receive sufficient resources to maintain a high state of combat readiness and later deploying units receive the remaining available funds.

Regular reserve weekend training using distance learning and the distributed interactive simulations should provide good training and learning opportunities that enhance unit and soldier readiness. The obstacle for the Army Reserve will be the dollars to purchase the technology and automation for the home station reserve centers.

The Army Reserve is constrained by the number of training days and various administrative regulations controlling their use. The typical unit has 24 days for weekend drills, usually one weekend of Saturday and Sunday per month, and 14 days for annual training or 38 total training days per year. 65

Leader Development. The leadership challenges in Force XXI result from a combination of many factors. One factor is units will have higher leader to led ratios. Another factor is situational awareness will provide timely and expanded information into many levels of all organizations resulting in more soldiers having real time information. The amount of information may be overwhelming causing additional pressure and stress. It is anticipated that future operations will be more complex and have closer scrutiny by international media. Is the current Army leader development program adequate? Are changes required?

"Learning Leader XXI" is a research effort by Colonel H.

Harback and Colonel U. Keller analyzing Force XXI leader
development.⁶⁷ This research concluded leader development must
produce adaptive, creative problem solvers skilled in the art of
military operations and battle command. It also affirmed the
validity of our current leader development programs but suggested
including in greater intensity the components of complexity,
ambiguity, speed and organizational change. Their research
postulated that to incorporate these components the learning
philosophy must expand to recognize the uniqueness of adult
learning, the difference between skills development and expanding
knowledge, and the need to adapt to a continuous learning
environment. They further state that professional development
must accept multiple developmental paths and explain technical
proficiency in relationship to position and responsibilities.⁶⁸

This research reaffirmed the importance of quality leadership as the most essential dynamic of combat power. 69 It recommends some changes to the current program and recognized the need for multiple leader development paths. If this research is validated and implemented by the Army, the acceptance of multiple leader development paths may provide some options for Army Reserve leaders that are not able to attend in resident courses or have command opportunities due to limited dollars and positions available.

The Chief of the Army Reserve is encouraging self development through nonresident and correspondence training opportunities to complete mandatory professional development educational requirements. This may be the only option for an increasing number of Army Reserve leaders because of limited school dollars and course allocations. Until distance learning is established at USAR centers for institutional and technical knowledge only those leaders assigned to high priority units will have access to live exercises, training simulations and combat training centers. Tiered resourcing has already limited funding for in residence professional development in the school houses.

Organizations. TRADOC guidance for future organizations⁷² begins by making units smaller, more diverse and with broadened missions. The division becomes the base tactical formation tailored for a specific mission. Units will be organized based on information nodes and staffs may not be constant in size but tailored for a mission. Combat service support organizations become modular, tailorable, flexible, and capable of task organizing for a full range of missions. Functions at all organizational levels will be reevaluated as digitization and other information technologies are fielded.

How the organizations are structured will impact the Army Reserve. Reorganizations ultimately effect unit readiness caused by changes in requirements for personnel with different military occupational specialties and equipment authorizations. Some of

the new specialties will be technicians and maintenance for the new technology equipment. Creating units composed of modular cells makes it easier to tailor for a CINC's mission. Another important consideration is ensuring communications compatibility with the active and guard operational logisticians. These are the supported organizations for most Army Reserve combat service support units.

It is likely that future organizations will be grouped into support packages consistent with current policy and procedures. These Force Support Packages are the groupings of Army Corps and Theater support units focused on a major regional contingency. Forty six percent⁷³ of the units in force support packages come the Reserve Components, this includes both the National Guard and the Army Reserve. Support package units are subject to short notice deployment for contingency operations so it is important to maintain a high state of readiness in these Army Reserve units.⁷⁴ Support package decisions integrate active and Reserve Components into a common national security mission.⁷⁵

Materiel. The Force XXI materiel capabilities will be horizontally integrated, capitalize on leveraging technology, and designed light, durable, with embedded technology for multipurpose applications and enhanced survivability. Force
XXI Operations foresees logistical support drawing from robotic equipment, automation, assured communications, split based

operations, and total asset visibility to allow anticipation of requirements and proactive logistics sustainment.

Many of the materiel changes in Force XXI are part of a modernization program focused on digitization and sensor technology⁷⁷. The implementation of this modernization is the fielding plans of the materiel. The coordination of these plans and deconfliction of priorities constrained by the limited dollars for modernization will require great diligence to insure interoperability. Supporting the new equipment systems when they are fielded, with parts, test equipment and trained technicians and continue to maintain current systems will be a challenge for the Army Reserve.

The Chief of Staff of the Army, General Reimer summarizes the materiel challenges as "the Army will be equipped with the most modern weapons and equipment the country can provide; relevant to the need's of the nation and adapting to meet the demands of today and the 21st century". The modernization programs for the Army face the reality of reduced funds and hard choices in fielding decisions and force structure⁷⁹.

Soldiers. Force XXI relies extensively on the individual soldier as a critical element for success in the future battle. 80 This quality soldier will be competent in a wide variety of technical tasks and capable to operate the new technology equipment. Force XXI Operations reveals a need for flexible and

adaptable soldiers at all levels who will receive initial entry training focusing on tapping the full potential in each soldier.

Recruiting and retention of quality people is a real challenge beginning in fiscal year 1997. The number of new accessions is projected to exceed 90,000 in 1997 and remain at this level for a few years. To compound the problem polls are showing a drop in the propensity for eligible recruits to enlist. In addition there has been a decline in retention rates. The intelligent, motivated, adaptable service age citizens with information age skills may not have the desire to join and remain in the Army. These same skills are also the ones industry is seeking in their workforce. As organizations become smaller and flatter, promotion opportunities decrease reducing the level of success attainable. The Army Reserve challenge will be providing realistic training, opportunities to grow to their potential, and to create a desire to remain in the Army Reserve.

Conclusion

The National Security Strategy and the National Military
Strategy established the ends, ways and means for the military as
an element of national power. Within the context of the Total
Force the Army Reserve contributes to the relevance of the
military element of United States national power. Joint Vision
2010 and Army Vision 2010 identify specific missions and tasks

for the Army Reserve as part of the land component that provides the Nation a formidable force for preventive defense, deterring aggression and if necessary to fight and win.

Force XXI is the start of the modernization of the Army for the 21st Century affecting doctrine, training, leader development, organizations, materiel and soldiers. This modernization process probably will not change the combat service support core competency of the Army Reserve. The majority of the Army's support forces will come from the Army Reserve, especially those Force Support Package units critical for a force projection contingency in a major regional crisis.⁸⁶

The Army Reserve will transition through Force XXI as the Army's combat service support connectivity from the tactical to the strategic. The degree of modernization will be directly proportional to the funds available based on the priorities established. In order to remain a relevant part of the Total Army, there is a need in the modernization programs to balance the tiered resourcing in the strategic force packages. The Army Reserve must be proactive in this transition to ensure that the new technology interfaces with existing systems.

Before any modernization decisions are made the Force XXI concept must mature into a doctrine that can be tested and experimented. This doctrine should focus the roles and missions of the Army Reserve. The core competencies of the Army Reserve may adapt to new or different missions, but based on the evolved

doctrine and the current reliance on the Army Reserve for combat service support functions it seems reasonable that the Army Reserve will have units integral to a force support package.

Automation is the core of the Force XXI training initiatives. The training development systems and processes are established but efficiencies may be required to meet the fast pace of change in doctrine, material and organizations. There will be an initial acquisition cost for the technology and linking networks that support individual, unit and self development training. Because training is a significant qualifier of unit readiness, it will be important for training automation to be included as part of the Army Reserve modernization process.

Quality leadership has been identified as an essential element of combat power today and this is anticipated to remain valid for the future. What has not been determined is how to incorporate the learning events and activities to produce the skills recognized as important in future leaders. Equally important for the Army Reserve is the parallel establishment of the alternatives in professional development.

Organizational change will probably be an evolutionary process driven by doctrine and materiel. Organizational structure, materiel and soldiers are intrinsically linked such that changes in any one of these imperatives affects the others and all have a direct impact on unit readiness. A critical

element of Force XXI is a quality soldiers that have the ability to operate high technology equipment and the physical stamina required for combat. Recruiting and retention of these type of men and women will be a challenge for the Army Reserve.

How does the Army Reserve remain relevant to the nation's needs? The Army Reserve is relevant when the units are trained and equipped, certified ready and capable of deploying on the C date required by the CINC on the time phased force deployment list. A task force commander should not have to improvise until C plus 30 or later if the right unit for the mission is in the Army Reserve. Contingencies usually develop rapidly and require quick response; this means the Army Reserve must maximize every training opportunity on the units' mission essential task list in order to be deployable on short notice.

Recommendation

In order to remain a relevant part of the Total Army in Force XXI the modernization of the Army Reserve should be balanced consistent with its missions. The common national security mission has been established, now the Army Reserve must be given the opportunity, resources and training to implement their part of the national strategy. It is especially important that Force Support Package units that are subject to deployment on short notice for contingency operations, be in a high state of readiness.

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